Africa does not lack vision. What it lacks is execution. The disparity between aspiration and execution characterises the African Union (AU) at now. The AU has for decades advocated for a comprehensive agenda that includes economic integration, financial independence, and a more powerful influence in global affairs.
The framework is outlined in Agenda 2063. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is expected to establish a single market worth $3.4 trillion.
However, implementation continues to be inconsistent. Intra-African trade is still less than a fifth of the continent’s total, and less than a third of flagship Agenda 2063 projects are on track. These figures are significantly lower than those observed in Europe or Asia. The issue facing Africa is not conceptual but rather institutional.
Ghana will occupy a prominent leadership position as First Vice-Chair of the AU following the February 2026 summit in Addis Ababa. The opportunity is significant and so is the risk of irrelevance. With an uncommon level of credibility, Ghana enters this moment. It combines a reputation for economic pragmatism with diplomatic reach and democratic continuity.
Ghana has been a prominent figure in recent global discussions regarding slavery and reparation justice, and its impact extends beyond the continent. However, Ghana’s credibility is only beneficial when it is implemented. The evaluation is whether Ghana can leverage its position to transition the AU from consensus-building to performance.
Financing the organization is prime priority. The AU’s autonomy and agenda-setting are both restricted by its substantial dependence on external partners, which is a structural constraint. A solution has been reached for an extended period: a 0.2% levy on eligible imports to finance the Union.
However, compliance is the problem, not design. Ghana should advocate for the complete implementation of the agreement among a core group of member states, in addition to transparency and incentives. Declarations will not result in financial independence. It will necessitate enforcement.
The realisation of the AfCFTA is the second priority. The economic potential of the agreement is well-established. By 2035, the World Bank anticipates that it could alleviate acute poverty for 30 million individuals and boost exports by over 80%.
However, the limitations are operational. Trade costs continue to increase throughout the continent because of persistent non-tariff barriers, fragmented customs systems, and border delays. Ghana can advocate for tangible progress in the digitalisation of critical trade routes and a continent-wide scorecard that monitors tariff cuts, customs efficiency, and the removal of barriers. Treaties alone will not be sufficient to achieve integration. It will be contingent upon accountability, data, and logistics.
In general, the AU must rectify its institutional accountability deficit. Frameworks are frequently endorsed by member states, but their implementation is often inadequate. Performance has been frequently replaced by consensus. A transition is necessary from commitments to outcomes.
The objective is not to assign blame, but rather to create incentives for effective delivery. Ghana’s responsibility goes beyond internal change. Africa remains fragmented in the global economy. The continent has 17% of the world’s population but only 3% of trade and receives little climate finance. Debt, trade, and climate negotiations are mostly done at the national level, reducing continental leverage. A concerted approach is needed. Ghana can promote African unity in debt restructuring, notably within the G20, and AfCFTA-external trade agreement alignment.
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A less obvious but equally crucial need is intellectual infrastructure. African policymaking lacks independent platforms to test ideas before implementation. Low debate and little iteration hamper policy development, making it difficult to adjust to changing circumstances and stakeholder feedback. The Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue (NISD) – an independent think tank dedicated to Africa’s hardest strategic questions, where policy makers, scholars, business leaders and citizens can pressure test ideas – addresses this gap.
Ghana has the platform, credibility and the moment. The question is whether it uses them to perform leadership or practice it. History does not remember who chaired the room. It remembers who changed the conversation.
— The Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue
